Threat
Babuk Ransomware Behind the SEXi Campaign
August, 9, 2024
18 minutes read
By Carlos Ramirez, Ocelot Threat Intelligence Team
Context
The purpose of this report is to provide information about the recent attacks carried out by the APT Inc. group, which has conducted various campaigns distributing the Babuk Ransomware. This report is based on the Diamond Model for adversary analysis. The Diamond Model organizes the key aspects of malicious activity in the shape of a diamond, which is visually easy to understand and symbolizes the relationship between these key aspects. The Cyber Threat Diamond Model is a methodology used to analyze and understand cyber threats from different perspectives. This model is based on four main components: adversaries, infrastructure, capabilities, and victims.
Adversaries: This sector identifies and analyzes the different malicious actors who could pose a threat to a system or organization.
Infrastructure: This quadrant examines the infrastructure used by adversaries to carry out their attacks.
Capabilities: This sector evaluates the skills and technical knowledge of the adversaries.
Victims: This final quadrant identifies the potential victims of cyberattacks.
By using the Diamond Model of cyber threats, the goal is to achieve a more comprehensive and detailed understanding of cyber threats, which helps organizations take proactive measures to protect themselves and mitigate associated risks.
APT Inc. is an adversary that primarily targets VMware ESXi servers in various regions, including Latin America (LATAM), with its most recent confirmed attack on a Chilean data center hosting company. This was confirmed by PowerHost’s CEO, Ricardo Rubem, who issued a statement mentioning that a ransomware variant had locked the company’s servers. The adversary does not have specific organizations to target; since its emergence, various organizations worldwide have been affected by this group.
The actors behind APT Inc gain initial access to the organization using well-known techniques such as phishing attacks, downloading malicious files, or exploiting known vulnerabilities in internet-connected assets. However, in their latest attack, the initial vector into the internal network remains unknown.
Figure 1: Diamond Model
Analysis using the Diamond Model
Adversary
| APT Inc | |
| Attribute | Active |
| Origin | Unknown |
| Activity Since | 2023 |
| Last Activity | 2024 |
| Type of Adversary | Ransomware |
| Motivation | Financial gain |
| Associated Groups | Babuk (Ransomware As A Service) |
Victims
Figure 2: Global Victims
| Affected Countries or Regions | Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru, the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Thailand, and Finland. |
| Global Organizations Affected | IxMetro Powershot |
| Mexican Organizations Affected | Retail, Education. |
Capabilities
- Uses the GO programming language.
- Encrypts users’ files.
- Implements 128-bit to 256-bit keys.
- Encryption based on LFSR and FSM.
- Output process similar to SERPENT.
- Generates 128 bits of output per cycle.
- Uses the symmetric Sosemanuk algorithm.
- The algorithm can quickly encrypt large amounts of information.
- Uses the asymmetric encryption algorithm Curve25519 for the encryption key.
- Affects Windows and Linux operating systems.
- The security of the 128-bit key algorithm has not been compromised so far.
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)
| Defense Evasion | Credential Access | Discovery | Command and Control | Impact | |
| Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Modify Authentication Process | File and Directory Discovery | Non-Application Layer Protocol | Data Encrypted for Impact | |
| Impair Defenses | Disable or Modify Tools | Network Share Discovery | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | Inhibit System Recovery | |
| Obfuscated Files or Information | Software Packing | Process Discovery | Service Stop | ||
| System Information Discovery | |||||
| System Network Connections Discovery | |||||
| System Service Discovery | |||||
About the SEXi Campaign
As is well known, one of the primary targets of the SEXi campaign is VMware ESXi servers. This campaign was first observed in March 2023, and its name is derived from a play on words with “ESXI,” which is a hypervisor solution sold by VMware.
Figure 4: SEXi Ransomware Encryption Extension
Regarding the operation’s infrastructure, there are currently no notable characteristics recorded. The ransom notes simply instruct victims to download the “SESSION” application and contact the provided address.
Figure 5: Ransom Note
The most recent observed attack was against the Chilean data center hosting company IX PowerHost in April 2024. This may be part of a broader ransomware campaign. Researcher Will Thomas discovered what he believes to be a binary related to this attack, named “LIMPOPOx32.bin” (MD5: 0a16620d09470573eeca244aa852bf70), labeled with a Linux version of the Babuk ransomware. However, this campaign has also affected at least three Latin American countries:
- SOCOTRA: used in an attack in Chile on March 23.
- LIMPOPO: used in an attack in Peru on February 9.
- FORMOSA: used in an attack in Mexico on February 26.
Go to https://getsession.org/
download install then add
05c5dbb3e0f6c173dd4ca479587dbeccc1365998ff9042581cd294566645ec7912 to your contacts and send a message with this codename — SOCOTRARansom Note, SOCOTRA Code (6f7bd3365859ff0cffccfd36bbafe4db)
“Hi. We have your data. If you don’t cooperate it will be made public. Go to https://getsession.org/; download & “”install; then add05c5dbb3e0f6c173dd4ca479587dbeccc1365998ff9042581cd294566645ec7912; mention this code LIMPOPO “
“in your message; get in touch with us;”
Ransom Note, LIMPOPO Code (8a525e77e07403eeb91238fa999195f3)
Hi. We have your data. If you don’t cooperate it will be made public. DO NOT touch your VM files, don’t move anything to make sure recovery is easy. Go to https://getsession.org/ download install
then add 05c5dbb3e0f6c173dd4ca479587dbeccc1365998ff9042581cd294566645ec7912 mention this code FORMOSA in your message get in touch with us
Ransom Note, FORMOSA Code (e253ce3cd4d1b20b7b54ff7807f2b45d)
The Ocelot team identified that the Babuk ransomware family is behind the SEXi variant.
Babuk has been operating since early 2021, affecting both Windows and Linux operating systems, and specifically targeting files related to VMware ESXi. A notable feature is the use of a lesser-known symmetric encryption called Sosemanuk (see Appendix A). In the same year, the author of Babuk released the source code on a hacking forum.
An analysis was conducted on a GitHub repository containing the Babuk source code. This repository has 3 folders with different ransomware variants and a Readme.md file. Below, the characteristics of the 3 variants are described, with the first two being ransomware targeting Linux:
- ESXi: This ransomware targets ESXi services and includes a blacklist of critical files it intends to encrypt. It performs a recursive scan of the entire disk and encrypts these files using a symmetric stream cipher called Sosemanuk. The key used for symmetric encryption is then encrypted with an asymmetric encryption algorithm, Curve25519.
- NAS: Targeting Linux and written in Go, this ransomware encrypts files using the symmetric encryption algorithm ChaCha20, and the encryption key is protected using the asymmetric encryption algorithm Curve25519. It performs a recursive scan of the host, starting from the root, and applies a whitelist of paths that should not be encrypted. It is noted that this variant has a version in Go; the primary difference between this variant and others is the type of encryption used. The ransomware note for Linux is shown below.
- Windows: Targeting Windows and written in Go, this ransomware encrypts files using the symmetric encryption algorithm ChaCha20, with the encryption key protected by the asymmetric encryption algorithm Curve25519.
To validate whether the SEXi variant is indeed the Babuk ransomware, we compared the sample: 0a16620d09470573eeca244aa852bf70 with the source code and confirmed the implementation of the encryption algorithm based on Sosemanuk.
Figure 6: Encryption Algorithm from Babuk Source Code in GitHub Repository
Figure 7: SEXi variant(At 0x08048F59): 0a16620d09470573eeca244aa852bf70
Note the box in Figure 7 of the source code, only the extension of the variant used in the campaign is modified: LIMPOPO, SEXi, etc. In recent campaigns, it has been observed that the group assigns a unique code to each victim for differentiation.
Recently, the group responsible for the SEXi ransomware identified themselves as APT INC and has breached numerous organizations. APT INC began its latest series of campaigns under this name in February 2024, using Babuk encryption to compromise Linux VMware ESXi servers and the leaked LockBit 3 encryptor to attack Windows systems. Despite the name change, the group continues to use its original encryption methods and remains destructive to its victims. In their latest attack on IxMetro Powershot, they demanded two bitcoins for each encrypted server.
It has been observed that APT INC has remained active. In their campaigns, their ransom notes continue to indicate the use of the software “SESSION”, with the same contact identifier but under the name APT INC.
Below are the ransom codes from recent campaigns:
| Date First Seen | Ransom Note Code | MD5 |
| 2024-04-19 16:47:02 (CST) | BULANYK | 40c6a5837deb4c78d8c578c6c2796fc5 |
| 2024-04-23 14:40:30 (CST) | AKMUN | 1fe4043de6791fa07af353b76d908622 |
| 2024-06-07 07:39:10 (CST) | MONJUKLY | a7b97d35c43c573e6df516c6fd61c5ae |
| 2024-06-07 09:03:33 (CST) | SAKGAR | 0683499fe27d394ce3d01679b8584766 |
| 2024-06-07 10:50:28 (CST) | AKTAKYR | 14f4b87e3e8acf857d6e3c8d95b103c8 |
| 2024-06-07 11:55:55 (CST) | SAZANDA | 03edbf590f62c0b6ecae581d106d5e4d |
| 2024-06-07 19:11:15 (CST) | BENTLIOBA | 9e9b734d0546905c4bd24a88dd8c6e25 |
| 2024-06-12 11:28:59 (CST) | TUTLYK | 46ff6f7c106dbf783f41513339a159b6 |
| 2024-06-19 08:19:43 (CST) | GYZYLTAKYR | 79e56d6015cce63ccc88eaf8ba7e85b8 |
| 2024-06-20 18:44:41 (CST) | MERGENLI | 018a12dc8fd39410d4bdbe9ab72f5c9f |
| 2024-06-22 08:29:20 (CST) | GAZANARYK | 654ac986ee1c5a14383525d8e75ec23d |
| 2024-06-25 19:43:54 (CST) | GARAKLY | abe85b4cd132fcd005b5d1327db7cc92 |
| 2024-06-28 10:40:20 (CST) | OZGALA | 53e528c97b91bb76823c91043bba6c87 |
| 2024-07-01 08:34:53 (CST) | DERWEZE | 36ec021bac8e33f0bc12815919c9f8fc |
| 2024-07-02 04:01:29 (CST) | GYJAKLY | 6f2ed93b3a7767a5b76543ea6d1506c8 |
| 2024-07-03 07:02:38 (CST) | GYZAN | cb3b3e24b7ddd7deca6b8b36838ae577 |
Conclusions
The information gathered about the APT INC group confirms that this group has been using Babuk ransomware variants under different identifiers such as “Formosa,” “Limpopo,” “Socotra,” “SEXi,” etc. The identifiers are used to manage their campaigns and administer them. The random names assigned to the binaries are not related to the victim companies, which is a tactic to confuse analysts and complicate incident response.
This type of Ransomware is already available to be replicated by our Batuta ZeroAPT Technology.
Infrastructure
IOCS
- IP Addresses
- 123[.]13[.]60[.]118
- 123[.]13[.]58[.]15
- 123[.]13[.]62[.]174
- Domains
- additiondasal-dasdrequired[.]sexidude[.]com
- easternfglo[.]sexidude[.]com
- surestniggaraloveme[.]sexidude[.]com
- sexi[.]faqserv[.]com
- ftp[.]innocent-isayev[.]sexidude[.]com
- additional[.]sexidude[.]com
- microsoftgetstarted[.]sexidude[.]com
- ftp[.]additional[.]sexidude[.]com
- innocent-isayev[.]sexidude[.]com
- sexidude[.]com
- petiatedtion-min[.]sexidude[.]com
- arrator-hasfull[.]sexidude[.]com
- dynamicdasd-dasdhosting[.]sexidude[.]com
- chelualdfg[.]sexidude[.]com
- aljyykbnt[.]sexidude[.]com
- continuedasdsa-nbvncheckout[.]sexidude[.]com
- deeytdely[.]sexidude[.]com
- identifrghhg[.]sexidude[.]com
- optionswandqweq-continue[.]sexidude[.]com
- requiredwe-nformation[.]sexidude[.]com
- optionsdas-continueda[.]sexidude[.]com
- seximage[.]xyz
- playboybeautybr[.]com
- URLs
- https[:]//petiatedtion-min[.]sexidude[.]com/
- https[:]//arrator-hasfull[.]sexidude[.]com/
- https[:]//dynamicdasd-dasdhosting[.]sexidude[.]com/
- https[:]//chelualdfg[.]sexidude[.]com/
- https[:]//aljyykbnt[.]sexidude[.]com/
- https[:]//continuedasdsa-nbvncheckout[.]sexidude[.]com/
- https[:]//deeytdely[.]sexidude[.]com/
- https[:]//additiondasal-dasdrequired[.]sexidude[.]com/
- https[:]//additiondasal-dasdrequired[.]sexidude[.]com/
- https[:]//easternfglo[.]sexidude[.]com/
- https[:]//identifrghhg[.]sexidude[.]com/
- https[:]//optionswandqweq-continue[.]sexidude[.]com/
- https[:]//requiredwe-nformation[.]sexidude[.]com/
- https[:]//surestniggaraloveme[.]sexidude[.]com/
- https[:]//surestniggaraloveme[.]sexidude[.]com/James/New%20ATT/bill[.]charged[.]html
- https[:]//optionsdas-continueda[.]sexidude[.]com/
- https[:]//seximage[.]xyz/dro/?1
- https[:]//playboybeautybr[.]com/tib/sexieatdotpiu
- SHA-256
- 7a3135d1da6110a069a38db4ae0441f421276a4e4911c6c93711a96d2db2cca4
- 29109792e5009e14ce1d03830dae10073d531b5fb10a4d1488ed173d76f93ef2
- 1b3afe446d6f9b46ac476a318116c534483b7f23465b6e7d19e9bdf2c01fd479
- f3f16f6bd395ab1cc3d6ca09ca88b4de8e383e36c075d12883955764f3c8b2e2
- 5d613aad17d62df2e8e8fd560330c4b1737e2df54d7cef03c3ee8212826dd8d3
- a779da7552abe672ea1dbecb43eaca9d9bd700b21a7cef78a797a9c23d613cad
- 5f51f73e657d1b3882fdc045b6996f9b5b461894d8062246a8de91352d390b6e
- 6882cc1d1503cbaaed4213268194c64330536a320cb11e334052b7f69031278c
- 00492655f5df05ef453c648b4570425493cb8f4df21838156cb1e5c0446d0c9e
- 03268f2c5729207c98f5cabc9a04e15f8d4a331a9760caa4c8e2c39842da7da6
- b5cd3e2433c3856a1bc40dca7c8b93e5b9e9d7235e2a69ebe31384d16278cd75
- d488b48f4f2e2d77d6fc9a4d592b2dc23f14effe8c3396ad19f0fc342f7858aa
- 581bc5287b992efdfafaccdf8ad117adec9e8ed84c1ac2f24cdb1c5a9ea51f8a
- 4f4c7817d8d2e11e415d7eae282223684eb79781d8d64f8b5bff9ef6c7b52fc5
- 975a1d1c009fdc65fb84c1c5e26a516e2136f18398d8e0d6dabd111fe532c14b
- 480101403f5a65cba633c4b4d4ebe87fe2711d9f3b4ee308b1092f8d1d915c28
- db3a6641139dea778c874bc7fb7260253aadd77bdf8108b4374f3cab0a6c0a4f
- f962d54db257c9865f9f4d04ec0fd516072bee39b9dbcb85d4a2d0b14323e0b3
- e4027f59556e4c29d77b396457b5a9af75a299a27b977c81dfce62e51d92c439
- d406683776845a4ba505cb60bbb75caa18fe671a44e5c224fa93b26bf41155a8
- 042906399e2db2fd4cda22960c82913dbfcdc2d03901080ae5f520e0bd33aa20
- 6fdc85490c3c6f2e4dba83e325dc6fe4340cc0b74f7ae08749542887d3f90519
- 27767fb888f0836f2a9edf1a30bb774d9dffa18b8196447d78ec32dd651b9d5a
- 6f7a890bab675402ee849ddec218e0ac380c5b9ff3dd3766acf6e5c2a8b9a379
- 8791eea95361498cb3f80d52f0fd020123c2de1ea23e948423e763bc8cc1b21f
- 8b3249ef4d72660259a08831320a7c97ef5e8a7cc4707f1dd4f77aa0d93e2ab3
- a5f32055751c9bf302d0e67d780c70d407d2dfc85c04a32ac7af94a607fae836
- d6ab95044f4cfabb2ad3ea7c483a54230cbc09fa23db22e9071be03804a436b7
- b5cf1306057fa6e248deba659011130771e918ca1a5cfd9cac247829a8b65171
- 205234c43de90157dc56bc9401bba77d6eda23a5ac2dfbb0af7ebb6944c666f7
- 68299d16b99e8e6afd08b6c07468145edafb811281c16419fb909460b0a2c424
- bebf54a073df7625170cc220c2c746d1cba2150deb4f50c3b0c87ad77bb15762
- 041e800eb422033eb692d6e9d215e06a54925de0dee698cfc1e2ce4c50dc1f20
- 17242addf9dd2afc79721ce924a6215f3db61bc6eef27147090e83400b37a6d2
- f66d6a5a40c2328c8770e5b7784dd7cff44c2262c7feb77dafa3cea670dd89ca
- 88718524514f63f2fdea84cf767d28bc96769e1dce20d202216277587022d2d1
- d82484e575c3733e6ebfc27da773aa420bab17e312515ee6a1391530004696e5
- 62b82416162b824ba9fea5fbe0fdefb04b883d7d23cc554ad0f5538c45c8d46d
- 7a5d9268d70680b752a3192db7ced8cd10ae04ac480444225e7964efd272c617
- 845ae02e71bf21e750606cb16610cc05a0fc37cd3a56033b4d55ed19fbefd934
- f0bfa0203785d16761e398a8107f6def1a234cdb028b9be13e1860d8b02742b6
- fe0343f5cf16fa0426f46feb0947342ef15e31a862493d53395da974c6db72a5
- c273aa956a3e1e4c878cec72423c880114e7bcd990b7c7386266957d94a045e0
- b3ab1e211a8c5ad30f79be15468e81467aed3286de6158b921a44ea8b36f8a47
- 1793da80d42508bab0fc38cacd394256481a4b29b37172d0a70053ce2b492d4e
- 84259823c7f08997784b5a77154552b85c9af23a5539fc1aecfa6a38bb04c2d6
- 7e5a225aaa4558a39a34f7694121fbbd0c94bf475b4b096c9d0c87d6f3ae1b44
- 7621860308af46f003d809b84ef199bbe132e7b22b0f68985a306aef062e7761
- dd9806165b3f20a806b5231f84add9b8e834895f22e0ed98066a656c6abcf5f4
- bfdb4fa67a8ec26c83771746fedd4c37fc716818981d4386e817792b7e4f1c08
- 904972023ef7817f59c1a78b2885fea56153cc2e60acc4ac47e509b0f8a82774
- cfab95a84fc282e8cad6449486e7dfe497f3ab43f871d4c3ad70258dcc5f84b8
- 647c735f430d5422a1affe36843603565157cf6f76617e5f101af55294f5102e
- 2dc26fb7393be5d0d9a99f7530e7b42556d900573cc3f3849fa27c5edf2b55c4
- d6b6af8cfc2cc11bbf6554f13d7c3a7eadd8f148fcf126a3b1f15959bded9a12
- 6571cae958eadd8d4eef09687c1ac0258563ff633bbddd3db5ebabb35a5b4abb
- d92be58cae837a56308c407360156209bd08f780a7335453a84f5955af3db331
- bb2d5957e1b6fb0f1d91eb87b45aa365559a74a6e3cbe9d115dc2249f751b109
- 50fc2209dd85dda785d5cc08954690b6b6cde9f4c1de0dcfe4819bf8f8267d96
- 6ba06ceda8135edd4ae3f12136f7e4e02ed9a253e2533f994e1f73b2f66e4891
- fc6eee93f28d29ceadb394fecab6de18eefebe50af3b79b786b80ca61894a3b2
- 503f16e60ae382c73c47dc01e98be4b7d1b5ec5d59b45deda24f714c8e1dc039
- MD5
- fd5cc630421b486248f93b6d85f8cbfd
- 925e09fde518efaa60a898080d2d66f1
- bd1a0b3ce63c846550d0b362a04dff66
- 87e31101b3936a317c0c9880c9750801
- 53579964981633dae3a80b4d7339db4a
- a208d43aeb8c4a32fee467375508f01a
- 6d547940c1a6b3c1531db570b76e546e
- c46d36e0a0ad67dfa01bd0f025f55b54
- 7edf35b18e7e1cfe43daa98bf8e612f3
- 551d0132ea1660b51b9ca102a2e1a429
- 1c988e13c4499984c2f149d7199f9077
- 45826ae51330e2db38c02dc412c0f596
- 7e5aa3a76de082eff57dd06724ae6dd1
- 450d4587e39707371b6b9660fdf73849
- 75ed9cfaa575724566ebc63c0b325aac
- 00c1875af11ba9636fb6c97203a28f6f
- 1fbf0c128accfab84fa0a58ed34dd85b
- 533dad422ae1379497305551563a3adf
- 1770021289af639a0064200c34b30f5d
- c2d6a459a44c30424a6479975705b2d2
- 9959d9c3ae4a52e2c64e7276145057bf
- c29302db5e9de4aecd16bfc8149f6944
- 43a7f7ada40fc1f483520acca8f5deaf
- 7fbec8acc2ca97e5058576ebb70960c9
- 8bc2982ab428e677e09cf5ac2deabc4b
- 695a283731f3fb73579115699ebc497d
- a0644a7bcc0c8bcb78da2d5829283cda
- 383c0223012b87f430f5e97ac2564bb4
- d4ec0f78dce76c70f175c3fa669de431
- 03af155ea7ba43f0f58cdbce16175868
- 8e79fc4562a719bdb7aafeaac80bdac5
- b2dec816550cc3a58500379c8fc15016
- 24edd9cf8a1baba409cf24a15324360f
- d90cd509a124b7960c1546ca7813cc87
- 47607214fb14b5ed8e1ea875b9c820c4
- e413f877df9bcb339a7d6bf0662a6757
- f60a7f3415472ba8b9ebb0a39bcd7a02
- ecc96cf7380fb9daef3fcdc60b5ec839
- a1bc7b72db7b72aa7a6c08a8327b5b85
- 3ce6ef10578032cf18a961e6465d2ce2
- 6bda659b696a2ce2f9d1087a7101bca8
- 97e6eb301a8724f3e9405512ffa3c277
- f4745871b111873e523bbe0f7234e8a8
- 917b7124752ec4457592646e70938486
- 496a632f6a4903bb29606c6e83032c57
- 369656cc1a5fb409beb871d8e0bb56fa
- 29e35eb015cefd331acc15c1b6876863
- 3f5a51ac31b1844480bab14213d3f552
- f0982ed8e81b51223bd223ff1b10e724
- 3742eaa53aba065cd771463b0e8aa0a1
- 99f882f847a62c2678154f9aed82463e
- c699a90f1fe01787c0ce169b0ca13012
- b5e956ddb5b4c329b6682bcd37ceff62
- df03d7918aabc51aa68d4028339c8297
- fbd7afa98a15883ef7e323a567ad99b2
- 007d791a8a8a37876272df8b760f5a7e
- 9a7f8d0e6098ebd93733bb3a91ae02e3
- 75d9687e5e37ceb12b93423e0a72b8bc
- f485412038002eea5be45fa5ae68ab8e
- 6f82c5d4be36f3fdf81bb3c04f43f90d
- 471418c0eb300bc714ce54f07666c377
Recommendations
- Perform Regular Backups:
- It is essential to back up all important data and store it in secure, disconnected locations.
- Periodically verify that backups work correctly and that data can be restored if needed.
- Keep Software Updated:
- Ensure that all operating systems, software, and applications are updated with the latest security patches.
- Use up-to-date antivirus and antimalware software to detect and remove threats.
- Implement Network Security Measures:
- Use firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDS) to monitor and protect the network.
- Segment the network to limit access and prevent the spread of malware in case of an infection.
- Educate Users:
- Train employees and users about phishing risks and how to recognize suspicious emails, links, and attachments.
- Promote a cautious approach when downloading files or clicking on unverified links.
- Monitor and Detect:
- Implement monitoring and analysis tools to detect anomalous behavior on the network.
- Respond quickly to any signs of suspicious activity.
- Create an Incident Response Plan:
- Develop and maintain an incident response plan that includes specific procedures for dealing with a ransomware attack.
- Conduct simulations and response exercises to ensure everyone knows how to act in the event of an attack.
Appendix A
Sosemanuk is a symmetric algorithm proposed for the eSTREAM project, a stream cipher initiative by the European Network of Excellence in Cryptology II (ECRYPT II). This algorithm is based on two ciphers: SNOW 2.0 and SERPENT. The adaptation yields the following characteristics:
- 128-bit to 256-bit keys
- 128-bit initial value (IV)
- Encryption Process:
- Like SNOW 2.0, it passes 32-bit through a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) to produce 32-bit output.
- Like SNOW 2.0, it passes the same 32-bit that entered the LFSR through a finite state machine (FSM) to produce 32-bit output.
- For every 4 cycles of the FSM, it is processed by an output function similar to that created by SERPENT, generating 4 blocks of 32 bits.
- These 4 blocks are XORed with the 4 blocks generated by the LFSR.
- Each cycle generates 128 bits of output.
- The algorithm can quickly encrypt large amounts of information.
Several theoretical attacks have been found against the algorithm, but none have managed to break the security for the 128-bit key.
